CHAPTER 7
OCCUPATION
COEXISTENCE,
COLLABORATION AND RESISTANCE
1423
In the
last week of August the Duke of Burgundy arrived in Paris, which did no one any
good as he had a great many troops with him who took everything from the villages
around Paris; the English were there too. Wine was then very much dearer than
it had been for a long time, and there were moreover very few grapes on the
vines, yet these English and Burgundians destroyed even these few, just as pigs
would have done and no one dared say anything about it.[1]
Anon.,
Journal of the Parisian Bourgeois, 1423
The
journal of the so-called Parisian Bourgeois provides one of the most vivid
pictures of life in Paris before, during and after the Anglo-Burgundian
occupation (1420–36). His comments (such as the above) provide a familiar,
rather stereotypical view of occupation, characterised by brutal and
destructive troops (here described as ‘pigs’), a cowed population both in the
city and its hinterland, and concern over food shortages. But the anonymous
author was anything but stereotypical, and his attitude to the occupiers far
from simplistic. In a period for which monastic and aristocratic evidence
predominates, his journal provides a genuine ‘voice’ beyond the ranks of the elite.
His remarkable account of life in Paris covered more than forty years
(1405–49), and few subjects escaped his attention. His concerns ranged from
national and international events to the weather, the price of food and drink
and other events in the French capital both mundane and extraordinary.
The
Bourgeois’ experiences offer a clear reflection of the changing character of
the Hundred Years War in the fifteenth century. English military strategy had
shifted from the chevauchées and raids characteristic of the
campaigns of the 1340s, 1350s and 1370s to territorial conquest – to sieges and
the widespread occupation of land. Technological developments as well as
political circumstances impelled these strategic changes. Firstly, English
commanders took advantage of increasingly effective gunpowder artillery, which
made sieges a more practicable proposition. Secondly, they were driven by
events in France, not least the opportunities provided by the political
fracture at the centre of government which Charles VI’s madness caused and the
Armagnac-Burgundian civil war tore open. The victory at Agincourt and the
subsequent conquest of Normandy are attributable to Henry V’s military genius
and the weapons he could employ, as well as to the deep fissures at the heart
of the French polity. It was Normandy, re-established under English control for
the first time since 1204, which provided the most important locus of
occupation and colonisation in the Hundred Years War. Then, following the
treaty of Troyes (1420), in addition to the duchy, Paris and much of northern
France came under English (Anglo-Burgundian) authority. The murder in 1419 of
Jean the Fearless, duke of Burgundy, had forced his successor, Philippe the
Good, into an English alliance that laid the foundations for the Dual Monarchy
and brought about the effective partition of half the country. Therefore, in
the fifteenth century, the Hundred Years War, which had been, to differing
extents, a dynastic and feudal conflict, a civil war, an economic struggle and a
clash over the French throne, also became a war of occupation.
For
the English this was a familiar situation. They had a long history of
occupation and of ‘colonial’ government stretching back through the Angevin
Empire to the Anglo-Norman realm established in 1066. Indeed, the Hundred Years
War was fought, at least in part, to restore and reoccupy those lands the
Plantagenets believed were theirs by birthright. When the war began what
remained of that birthright, the English foreign lordships, was far from
negligible; it comprised Wales, much of Ireland, the Isle of Man, the Channel
Islands, Scotland (in theory) and, of course, Gascony. Lands in France,
therefore, were already under English occupation at the start of the war in
1337, and England’s political presence in France had been chiefly responsible
for the outbreak of the conflict. Within ten years of the beginning of the
struggle the first additions were made to the English dominions with the
conquest of Calais in 1347 and its surrounding marches. Then, after the treaty
of Brétigny in 1360, nearly a third of France fell into English control in what
became the principality of Aquitaine. Much of this territory was lost soon
after the resumption of the war in 1369, and in response the English resorted to
a tried, tested and, in the 1370s, an almost completely ineffective raiding
strategy. When Henry V led English forces back to France in 1415 he, too,
embarked on a chevauchée, although he was not reluctant to besiege
Harfleur. There was, however, a clear shift of policy in 1417 when Henry began
the assault on Normandy and the conquest of land, not merely of men, became the
primary objective.[2]
English
policy towards the inhabitants of captured territories in the early part of the
1417–19 campaign tended to be brutal; indeed, some native populations were
deliberately displaced, to be replaced with more trustworthy settlers. This
became a common feature throughout the period of English control: an
immigration policy was enforced that aimed to ensure political and military
security by implanting the king’s ‘loyal subjects’. For those native
populations that did find themselves under English dominion conditions varied
greatly. For some it proved a devastating experience; for others a reasonably
comfortable modus operandi was achieved. In either case,
however, English occupation might be no worse than exploitation by French nobles, écorcheurs androutiers or
garrison warfare, petite guerre (guerrilla warfare), or
excessive demands for patis (extortion money) and uncontrolled
taxation. Indeed, each in their own way formed a different sort of occupation,
and might entail a comparable level of oppression.[3]
Any
occupation presents the occupied with a number of possible responses:
populations or individuals may resist; they may acquiesce, either passively or
indignantly; or they may collaborate. Few of these were black-and-white
decisions in the Hundred Years War because of fluctuating circumstances and the
mutability of national identities and allegiances.[4] Consequently,
reactions to occupation varied widely between and among those options. The
nobility, while suffering less than most from occupation, were often faced with
difficult political choices, nonetheless. This was certainly the case for many
in Brittany, Gascony, Aquitaine, Normandy and Paris at different stages of the
war. In May 1360, with the sealing of the treaty of Brétigny, many of the
Aquitainian nobility were forced to offer their allegiance to England. Some,
such as Guichard d’Angle, did so and remained loyal to the English. Lord of
Angle-sur-l’Anglin and Pleumartin, and a substantial landowner in the northern
march of Poitou, Guichard had fought for Jean II at Poitiers, but he became
such a trusted member of the Black Prince’s household that he was appointed
tutor to the young Richard of Bordeaux (later Richard II). For others, however,
such as Jean d’Armagnac, the former lieutenant of the king of France in
Languedoc, this proved an uneasy alliance at best. Although he fought for the
Black Prince at the battle of Nájera in 1367, Armagnac was instrumental in
instigating the revolt against the English regime that began in 1368. A more
complex situation involved the shifting allegiances of the Albret clan. Members
of the family had long formed a bulwark against Valois ambitions in the duchy
of Gascony, but in 1368 some of them were induced to support the French king,
and Arnaud-Armanieu d’Albret joined the count of Armagnac in leading the revolt
against the Black Prince.[5]
In
this way families could become politically divided as a consequence of
occupation. Guillaume de Clinchamp offered his allegiance to Henry V in 1419 in
order to retain his lands in Normandy, and one of his sons entered the service
of John Kemp, the bishop of London. Two others, however, joined the French
garrison of Mont-Saint-Michel. In 1433 the daughter of Guillaume le Tavernier,
a rich bourgeois from Rouen, who had grown wealthy during the English
occupation, married Jacques de Calais, an important member of the Council of
Normandy. Their three sons, however, all refused to pay allegiance to the
English and settled in the kingdom of Bourges[6]. Such stresses were
evident throughout the war and loyalties might not be divided only between
Plantagenet and Valois. The conflicting ambitions of the lords of Navarre and
Brittany, and political strains between the other Princes of the Blood,
especially during the Armagnac-Burgundian civil war, placed great stresses on
individual and collective allegiances. Georges de La Trémoïlle (c.1382–1446),
for example, was a favourite of Charles VII, whereas his brother, Jean
(1377–1449), was chamberlain and counsellor to Philippe the Good of Burgundy.
The family estates fell under both French and English jurisdictions in the
1420s. Despite this the brothers remained on good terms and sought to maintain
their joint interests. They managed to do this but under unfortunate
circumstances: in 1427 the English authorities confiscated Georges’s property
and handed it over to Jean.[7]
In
general, however, occupation created somewhat more pressing problems for the
peasantry. As Jean Juvénal des Ursins wrote, to describe the sufferings of the
French people following the English invasion of 1415 would take a book as long
as the Bible.[8] It
is, however, difficult to assess precisely what determined peasant responses to
occupation and certainly to judge if it truly mattered whether the oppressor
was English, French, Scottish or the leader of a mercenary company. For
example, while some of the revolts against the English in the latter stages of
the occupation of Normandy have been characterised as nationalist uprisings,
this is a difficult case to prove conclusively. It is certainly the case that a
national consciousness developed in both England and France over the course of
the Hundred Years War, and Charles VII does seem to have benefited from local
support when he began the reconquest of Normandy. There is, for example,
evidence of collusion with French royal forces in a number of towns, even
strongholds as significant as Cherbourg. Nonetheless, by this stage it was in
the self-interest of the peasantry to support the Valois – the political tide
had clearly turned in France’s favour. Prior to this, in the midst of the
struggle, individuals and communities took advantage of circumstances as they
presented themselves, sometimes changing allegiance as opportunities arose or
as various factors became significant. Influences were often local rather than
national. For others stability was an end in itself. Many valued a peaceful
existence regardless of the identity of their lord.[9]
The
alternative, endemic warfare, led to a breakdown of law and order, although
there was usually a governmental vacuum in the early stages of occupation also.
This certainly happened following the treaty of Brétigny when the English
annexed nearly a third of France, and again following the conquest of Normandy.
In this political void companies of brigands (described variously as tuchins,
brigans or godins) often formed among the French
peasantry. This was partly a response to governmental collapse and partly an
act of self-defence. The peasants felt they were being robbed and harassed to
such an extent by their fellows and their new lords that they were forced to
take matters into their own hands. This led to a spiral of violence. In the
1360s one Jean le Jeusne, who was forced by such circumstances into brigandage
in the Oise region north of Paris, claimed that because of the lawless
activities of soldiers and others ‘no labouring man, or any other subject in
the kingdom, dared venture securely or go about their business in the district
for fear of being killed or taken for ransom’. As a consequence, Jean claimed,
he had been forced out of self-preservation to take up brigandage and robbery.[10] The same situation
developed in the 1420s in the context of the ongoing civil war and the
partition of France. In 1422, while Henry V fought his final campaign at Meaux
north-east of Paris, English forces pillaged much of Brie. According to the
so-called Parisian Bourgeois, the peasantry complained that
because
of them and the other lot no one could get any ploughing or sowing done
anywhere … Then most of the labourers stopped working in despair, abandoned
their wives and children and said to each other: What shall we do? Let it all
go to the devil, what do we care what becomes of us? We may as well do the
worst we can instead of the best. We’d be better off working for Saracens than
for Christians, so let’s do all the damage we can … It’s our rulers who are the
traitors, it’s because of them that we must … escape to the woods like strayed
animals.[11]
A
collapse of law and order in the immediate aftermath of conquest was,
therefore, not uncommon, but it was unwelcome and costly both politically and
financially, and not a situation that occupying forces wished to tolerate for
long. Occupation inevitably involved changes of government, although these were
not wholesale. Typically some administrative revisions took place, and new
officials were almost always employed, but local governmental structures were
usually retained whenever possible. Furthermore, measures were often taken to
try and ensure that the transfer of power was not overly provocative. So, while
occupation brought with it immediate demands to pledge loyalty to the new regime,[12] the Plantagenets
made considerable efforts to emphasise their legitimacy. The ‘natural and
rightful’ descent of the English ruling house from the Capetian dynasty was
stressed and with it the lawful English claim to French territories. In spite
of efforts to ease the transitions, however, it was abundantly clear that a new
political dispensation had been introduced: areas under English occupation and
authority became subject immediately to the English Crown (pays subgiet au
royaume d’Angleterre) and those who lived in these areas were, thereafter,
considered the king’s subjects. As such they came to share, or had imposed upon
them, a common identity.[13]
Within
the lordships groups and individuals recognised their membership of this wider
collective – as subjects of the king of England – certainly when it suited them
to do so. In 1341 Edward III received a letter containing a range of colonial
grievances from members of the English lordship in Ireland. They wrote to him
stating ‘whereas various people of your allegiance, as of Scotland, Gascony and
Wales often in times past have levied war against their liege lord, at all
times your English liege people of Ireland have behaved themselves well and
loyally’.[14] Over
the course of the Hundred Years War this political identity – or at least a
veneer of it – was extended throughout those territories that came under
English occupation.
Throughout
the English lordships in France, the British Isles and Ireland that veneer was
polished by a certain amount of governmental standardisation. This resulted
from the replication of various policies and legal approaches. As state
institutions developed and personnel circulated between the Plantagenet
dominions, English experiences in the British Isles and Ireland influenced the government
of occupied territories in France. Similarly, many Englishmen who served in the
colonies in France subsequently took up offices in the British lordships or on
the Marches of Scotland and Wales. In this way what might, anachronistically,
be described as a ‘colonial staff’ transferred its experience and approach to
government throughout the English lordships.[15] This is especially
evident among the upper echelons of the administration. John Fastolf
(c.1378–1459), for example, served in Bordeaux, Normandy and Ireland.[16] John Talbot held
senior offices in Wales, Ireland and France between 1404 and 1453.[17] Richard, duke of
York (1411–60), served as lieutenant of France (1436, 1440) and Ireland (1447),
and because of his extensive estates he also had connections with Wales.[18]
Nonetheless,
despite these similarities, the experience of occupation and English attitudes
towards the lordships they occupied varied considerably. Political and military
circumstances differed as did cultural traditions, social customs, languages
and dialects. The character of occupation might also be shaped by the nature of
the area’s historic relationship with England. Gascony, for example, had been
under English control for nearly two hundred years by the time the Hundred
Years War began – although major outbreaks of political unrest and violence had
regularly punctuated this period. However, although often described as
England’s first colony, there was little English settlement in Gascony and few
attempts to expropriate land or to build a new society on an English model. Few
Englishmen apart from those performing eminent military or administrative
service settled in the duchy, although it is possible more substantial
settlement took place during the lifetime of the principality of Aquitaine
(1362–71).[19]
Gascony,
therefore, was not ‘occupied’ per se but, clearly, nor was it independent: its
government was in the hands of a prince, lieutenant or chief governor appointed
by the king of England and acting with vice-regal authority. Governing
conditions, which had always been problematic as governors of the duchy from
Simon de Montfort (1248–52) onwards had found to their cost, became even more
difficult when the treaty of Brétigny appended a considerable swathe of
southern and central France to the duchy, totalling nearly a third of the
country. Placed in the care of Edward of Woodstock (the Black Prince),
appointed prince of Aquitaine in 1362, the occupation of this greater Aquitaine
resulted in rebellion after some six years caused in part by a style of
government which, although far from oppressive by English standards, took
little account of local traditions and culture. In particular, the imposition
of a range of Anglo-Gascon governing practices did not sit well with those
Aquitainian nobles who had been forced into English allegiance by the 1360
treaty. In a letter designed to foment revolt, Louis d’Anjou, Charles V’s
lieutenant in Languedoc, wrote to the Aquitainian nobility in 1368 reminding
them of the ‘Ordonnances, indictions et exactions de fouages [hearth taxes] et
autres griefs et nouveletés’ which the Black Prince had exacted and introduced.
Because of this the revolt against the prince’s administration may be seen,
chiefly, as a failure of ‘good lordship’, one caused, in the main, by mutual
misunderstanding over what good lordship entailed.[20] One must also
acknowledge that the man responsible for the devastation of the 1355 grande
chevauchée was hardly likely to be popular with those whose lands and
property had been burned and pillaged so horrifically.
By
contrast, most of the Gascons (as opposed to those from the greater Aquitaine)
valued their connections with England, although they almost certainly preferred
a less active political representative and a more distant relationship. When
Richard II, as part of his peace negotiations with France in the 1390s,
proposed that his uncle, John of Gaunt, be made duke and hold Gascony of the
French Crown, the scheme foundered because of the Gascons’ reaction: they
claimed they would not be ruled by anyone other than the king of England or his
heir apparent. Gascon representatives who visited the English court stated
‘that from times long past they had been accustomed to be governed by the
English crown and not by third parties set in authority over them by the
exercise of the king’s will, with the single exception of the prince of Wales
as the true heir to the English throne’.[21]
Because
Gascony (if not the greater Aquitaine) had long been an English dominion it was
something of a special case in the Hundred Years War. The conflict also created
circumstances in which the English came to occupy other parts of France, not
through direct conquest but as a consequence of political alliances: Brittany
was one such area. The outbreak of the Breton civil conflict in 1341 between
Jean de Montfort (1295–1345) and Charles de Blois (1319–64) provided another
theatre in which to fight the Hundred Years War: the ducal struggle became
subsumed under the Anglo-French hostilities. This was not surprising since the
dukes of Brittany held land in both France and England and paid homage to both
kings, something that had presented Duke Jean III with a major problem when the
war began in 1337 – to whom should he offer his allegiance? Matters then became
even more complex when Jean died in 1345, leading to a succession crisis and an
opportunity for both France and England to strengthen their political influence
over Brittany and its lord – one of the peers of the realm. The duchy was
geographically as well as politically important: it offered a potential English
bridgehead to the French interior and a modicum of control over the vital sea
route between Gascony and England. Edward III as guardian of the future Jean IV
de Montfort (ruled 1364–99) offered support to him; while Charles de Blois, a
claimant to the duchy through his wife, Joan de Penthièvre, allied with the
Valois. With Jean (IV) only an infant, King Edward appointed an English
lieutenant to care for his ward’s interests and assume control in the
Montfortist areas of Brittany. Consequently, English troops were active in the
duchy from 1342. The civil war soon became localised, usually taking the form
of siege and counter-siege. This gave individual captains and commanders a
great deal of independence, and certain English garrisons effectively occupied
the areas under their control.
Many
took advantage of the situation to demand patis (collective
ransoms or protection money). The three principal English fortresses – Vannes,
Bécherel and Ploërmel – shared between them the patis of 124
parishes by 1359.[22] Walter Bentley, the
English lieutenant (appointed in 1350), tried to control the practice,
denouncing it in 1352, but it only came to an end, and then only briefly, in
1365 with the treaty of Guérande. This confirmed de Montfort’s victory in the
civil war, which had been secured by his triumph at the battle of Auray. When
the war reopened in 1369, de Montfort’s attempts to play Plantagenet and Valois
off against each other, and the new involvement of a number of Breton captains,
most notably du Guesclin and Olivier de Clisson, led to many towns paying
ransoms to English and French troops, sometimes simultaneously. In the 1370s
the apatisation of the countryside was widespread and
conditions worsened for the inhabitants.[23]
Gascony,
the principality of Aquitaine and Brittany provide varying models of English
‘occupation’, but the examples offered by English dominions in the British
Isles are also important in the context of the Hundred Years War. English
approaches to occupation in France were informed, in large measure, by
experiences in Wales, Ireland and, to a lesser extent, Scotland in the late
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. In turn the Hundred Years War
reshaped attitudes in England to the Welsh, Irish and Scots. The financial and
military demands of the conflict ensured that these British and Irish lordships
had to be exploited for the English war effort. Welsh troops, for example, were
recruited in substantial numbers and played highly significant roles in a
number of campaigns to France. This, clearly, was not indicative of an entirely
harmonious relationship as English colonial policies, many of them the
consequence of war and some implemented by Welshmen, contributed directly to
the Glyn Dŵr revolt that began in 1400. An attempt to throw off colonial
control, this led to brutal reprisals and the introduction of draconian
measures aimed further to limit the political, economic and military influence
of Welshmen in Wales.[24] The revolt certainly
made Henry V wary of using Welsh soldiers on his French expeditions: by
comparison with the thousands of Welshmen recruited for the Crécy-Calais
campaign, only 500 soldiers were recruited for the Agincourt expedition, and
all of these were from south Wales, distant from the epicentre of the rising.[25]
The
repressive legislation implemented by the English in Wales in the early years
of the fifteenth century reinforced measures Edward I had taken to impose his
conquest just over a hundred years earlier. Similar action had been taken
around the same time to maintain the political and social integrity of the
lordship of Ireland: in 1297 the Dublin parliament denounced and prohibited the
adoption of various Gaelic-Irish habits and traditions by English settlers,
describing them as ‘degenerate’. Such measures were clarified and extended in
the Statute of Kilkenny (1366), perhaps the most famous official condemnation
ever written of the Irish and their way of life. The statute sought to prohibit
certain interpersonal and intercultural links between the Gaelic-Irish and
Anglo-Irish populations: marriages were banned as was the use of the Irish
language by the settler community; so too was the adoption of Irish clothing,
hairstyles, means of riding (i.e. without a saddle). One should not give
patronage to a Gaelic Irish poet or clergyman without licence to do so.[26] It has been
suggested that action of this sort in Wales and Ireland, as well as the
attempts made to establish English authority in Scotland, indicates either a
racist or certainly an anti-Celtic mentality. Consequently, it is argued that
there was a complete contrast between English attitudes to governing Celtic
countries and French dominions – the distinction being between those areas that
had been conquered rather than inherited.[27]
Such a
distinction, however, is called into question by events in the Hundred Years
War. Calais, much of the principality of Aquitaine and many of those lands in
Normandy and northern France acquired by Henry V were the product of conquest
or, at the least, of a diplomatic settlement secured through military force.
Indeed, those areas Henry had captured prior to the treaty of Troyes in 1420
were explicitly described as pays de conquête.[28] In many of these
areas ‘colonial’ government might be, and was often viewed as, oppressive and
exploitative – that is when there were no major expulsions of the French
population. Furthermore, the prosecution of the war, the developments
associated with the rise of the so-called ‘war state’ and the transfer of officials
throughout the king’s lordships ensured increasing similarities of policy and
practice in all areas under English control. This mimicked the situation in
England itself where markedly more restrictive legislation in the post-plague
period brought about the Peasants’ Revolt: clearly, the heavy hand of the state
proved no more welcome to the English than to those in the foreign lordships.
The
two main periods of English colonisation in the Hundred Years War were founded,
in part at least, on battlefield successes: at Poitiers and Agincourt, and the
treaties that followed – Brétigny and Troyes respectively. The first of these,
eventually, produced the short-lived principality of Aquitaine, a colonial
experiment that ended in rebellion and the resumption of the war in 1369. Some
thirty years later the Glyn Dŵr rebellion again altered English attitudes to
occupation. The revolt hardened opinions about the Welsh, and also provided the
future Henry V with valuable practical military experience before he embarked on
the next major colonial programme in the Hundred Years War: first, the capture
of Harfleur in the Agincourt expedition and, second, the conquest of Normandy.[29]
The
Normandy campaign was shaped, in part, by Henry’s and England’s historic claim
to the duchy.[30] As
the Gesta Henrici Quinti had it, Henry ‘prepared to cross to
Normandy in order to recover his duchy of Normandy, which belongs to him by a
right dating from the time of William the first, the Conqueror’. At the same
time he also aimed to make good ‘his divine right and claim to the duchy of
Aquitaine’.[31]
Military success and the vicissitudes of the French civil war ensured
Henry secured this and more in the treaty of Troyes, although the treaty also
changed the colonial character of Henry’s French estates now he was to be their
king. Prior to 1420 it had been politically expedient to promote the concept of
an independent Normandy within France; after 1420 Henry ceased to do this. The
duchy now was to be considered part of the kingdom and the king ceased to style
himself duke of Normandy.[32]
The
occupation of Normandy provides the most important example of English
colonisation during the Hundred Years War, one that involved a major settlement
programme, especially at Harfleur, Cherbourg and Caen. Henry’s lands in
northern France, which he claimed by right of conquest (par droit de
conquête), were settled with those men whom the king trusted to defend,
maintain or augment those conquests: English, Irish, Welsh and Gascon – again,
manpower and other resources from all of the king’s lordships were used and
transferred between them. Strategic settlement was seen as important in
establishing and maintaining control over an acquired territory. This had been
an approach the English had adopted regularly in the foreign lordships
throughout the British Isles and Ireland. By the end of 1420 some five thousand
grants of properties had been made.[33]
Following
the treaty of Troyes further lands became available to Henry and John, duke of
Bedford, which could be used to reward and needed to be held and protected.
Property was confiscated from the dauphin’s followers and parcelled out to
English loyalists[34]. The
settlement programme received a further impetus after the battle of Verneuil
(17 August 1424), when a substantial number of small grants were made to
Englishmen of all ranks. More settlers were then brought in following the
Congress of Arras to bolster the position in Normandy after the Burgundian
defection and the loss of Paris (1435–36).[35] Henry V, Bedford,
their lieutenants and successors gave these colonists a personal stake in
maintaining La France Anglaise and at the same time ensured
they had specific responsibilities to fulfil if they accepted the proffered
lands or offices. The grants, then, were closely tied to the Crown’s military
objectives, and many were made in tail male in an attempt to ensure continuity
of ‘English’ ownership over successive generations. Among the recipients of
major grants were Thomas, duke of Clarence, who, after the fall of Falaise in 1418,
received three vicomtés;[36] Thomas Montague,
fourth earl of Salisbury, who, in addition to various territories and numerous
offices, became count of Perche in 1419;[37] and Edmund Beaufort,
first duke of Somerset (c. 1406–55), became count of Mortain in 1427,
captain-general and governor of Maine in 1438 with title to the county in 1442.
In 1447 Edmund succeeded Richard, duke of York, as lieutenant of France and of
the duchies of Normandy and Gascony.
Those
who benefited chiefly from the settlement programme were, however, not the
great nobility, but lesser knights – having most to gain they were most willing
to fight to defend those gains. ‘[T]he receipt of land bound the recipient not
only to defend it but to contribute through his own military service and that
of others, towards the provision of an army ready to fight and conquer in the
king’s name.’[38]
This was, in effect, an extension of the usual recruitment policy. The
chance of financial advantage had drawn most regular soldiers into the army in
the first place, and because wages were rarely generous and often paid
erratically other profits of war became attractive. In earlier campaigns these
had included plunder and booty from raiding, demands for protection money or
the promise of a plump ransom. However, the chance to gain land of one’s own
was a new and enticing incentive.
In all
these colonies, in Britain, Ireland and France, the main concern of English
administrations was to establish then maintain political control, especially in
urban centres either through settlement or other means. Either a substantial
proportion of the native population would be displaced or attempts were made to
establish good relations with that population. The latter policy was
particularly difficult to achieve if the campaign preceding the capture of the
territory or town had been especially harsh. The campaign to take Calais
(1346–47) is well known in this regard; indeed, the siege was so harsh and
Edward III’s temper so violent that no attempt was made to establish good relations.
The inhabitants were expelled and the town repopulated with English settlers,
although the population of the surrounding marches remained largely unchanged.[39]
By
contrast, in the principality of Aquitaine the Black Prince sought to establish
good relations with urban communities by confirming the privileges of many
towns and gaining support among politically important families and individuals.
However, having been subjected to the chevauchées of 1355 and
1356, many in the new principality were less than well disposed to the new
regime and, notoriously, the prince had particular problems securing the
loyalty of the Aquitainian nobility, although his record in this regard is not
one of complete failure.[40] The policy which his
brother, Lionel of Clarence, employed as lieutenant of Ireland at precisely the
same time (September 1361–April 1364; December 1365–November 1366) was similar
and, similarly, proved problematic.[41] Later English
settlement policies in Normandy and northern France followed a comparable pattern
and focused on securing support in urban centres. In Normandy, the towns formed
the economic and administrative centres of the duchy, and so gaining control
over them and support within them was considered essential by the new
administration. It was particularly important to ensure residents fulfilled
their military responsibilities, such as keeping watch and defending the town’s
walls (guet et garde).[42] If these
responsibilities continued to be fulfilled, then fewer English soldiers were
required.
The
English experience in Ireland may well have shaped approaches to the
colonisation of Normandy. It has been suggested that the English feared the
creation of a ‘middle nation’ in Normandy such as developed across the Irish
Sea – a settler community distanced and different politically and culturally
from both the mother country and the local population.[43] Such concerns are
fascinating from a sociological perspective but they do not seem to reveal the
reality of the situation as it developed in Normandy. Rather than the hybrid,
independent culture which the English administration faced in the ‘degenerate’
Anglo-Irish lordship, a much simpler pragmatism can be seen at work in northern
France. In establishing the colony in Normandy, Henry V’s policy had shifted between
brutality and leniency. His early campaigns, at Harfleur and Caen (captured 4
September 1417), for example, were characterised by hostage-taking, mass
expulsions, pillage and the imposition of martial law. Town archives and
centres of civic government were often destroyed as a statement made to
demonstrate the end of the old regime. At Harfleur, as at Calais, a large
proportion of the local population was expelled after a long siege and English
settlers were invited to take their place. Merchants were prominent among those
offered property in the town, as they had been in Calais, in the hope this
would stimulate the economy.[44] Henry’s initial
policy at Harfleur and Caen was designed to ensure he faced little opposition
elsewhere. It proved reasonably successful, although certain towns did resist
tenaciously. Later, once the conquest was complete, Henry and his successors
sought to foster a spirit of conciliation although they maintained an
intimidating military presence. Certain towns such as Bayeux, which had offered
Henry no resistance, and Rouen, which surrendered after a long siege on 19
January 1419, both had their privileges confirmed. Townsmen were encouraged to
view the king as a legitimate ruler and Henry invited them to petition him
through English legal channels, conditioning them to view the new regime as the
ultimate arbiter of justice. Circumstances changed with the treaty of Troyes:
once recognised as the heir-apparent, Henry swore to govern France according to
its ancient laws and maintain all rights and privileges in the kingdom.[45]
The
success of English regimes in France depended on the ability to communicate
with the local population: administrators and military commanders needed some
grasp of the French language. This proved somewhat problematic because in
England, just at this time, Henry V was promoting the use of English for
political and nationalistic purposes. Consequently, the use of French in
England diminished while the use of French by Englishmen in France became
increasingly necessary. French (or Anglo-French) therefore had to be used
extensively by Englishmen as part of the process of conquest and occupation.
Differences in pronunciation no doubt existed and most were almost certainly
not sophisticated in their use of language, but communication could usually be
achieved. Garrison troops and lower-level administrators often struggled with
the language, especially in the early months of an occupation. There are
several reports of violence (on both sides) when the English could not make the
inhabitants understand what they wanted. For example, in Rouen in 1427, English
soldiers were recounted as shouting at the French inhabitants to ‘speak
English’ (as the evidence is recorded in French it is not certain in what
language they yelled), and in 1425 there were complaints that the commanders
used ‘mots etrangers’ – presumably English words – as passwords so the townsmen
who were forced to serve in the watch could not understand.[46]
In
occupied areas levels of antagonism varied and were subject to a range of
factors, many connected with the number and behaviour of foreign soldiers. The
number of troops deployed varied according to military and political
circumstances, but in general most towns only had small garrisons other than in
times of crisis.[47] For
example, during the period from 1419 to 1449 the size of the English garrison
in Mantes (Normandy), a town of around 3,000 people, fell to as few as 21 in
1428 prior to the reverse at Orléans, and rose to as many as 480 after the fall
of Paris in 1436. It seems that for much of this time relations were reasonably
cordial between the occupying force and the local population. The maintenance
of such an atmosphere often depended on the character of the captain and/or his
lieutenant. Circumstances, however, often dictated that captains and garrison
commanders rarely held their positions for long. In Mantes eleven men held the
office in the first ten years of occupation after 1419. However, although the
captain of a garrison was usually English, his lieutenant might not be and nor,
indeed, might all the soldiers – up to an eighth of a garrison could be of
French origin.[48] This
could influence the atmosphere of an occupation considerably.
If
relations remained cordial it allowed for the development of personal
relationships, friendships and indeed marriages. Marriages between colonists
and colonised were by no means uncommon, although in Normandy royal permission
might be required for unions between settlers and natives. Some marriages, no
doubt, were influenced by the opportunity they offered Norman women to preserve
their property and livelihoods, and perhaps even their lives. Other unions were
clearly the products of genuine affection, and when the Lancastrian position in
Normandy collapsed, a number of Englishmen (and at least one Welshmen) remained
in France with their wives.[49]
In
this regard, as in others, successful relations between England and the
occupied territories depended on integration as well as domination. Most
administrations found it best to work with existing power structures and
employed local men in official positions when possible. Nonetheless, it
required careful diplomacy to avoid showing favouritism and antagonising the
various feuding noble houses. In Lancastrian Normandy, apart from the creation
of a chambre des comptes at Caen, many Valois administrative
structures remained in place. Although some new practices were introduced,
where possible the English sought to use established systems and exploit
existing obligations rather than introduce new methods of governance and
taxation.[50] Generally,
Englishmen were appointed to the senior offices while lesser positions stayed
in native hands, but there is no doubt that daily government relied heavily on
the support of the indigenous population.
Conciliation
and negotiation were also sought by maintaining representative assemblies and
allowing meetings of the regional Estates to take place. English
administrations used such meetings mainly to try and ensure taxes were raised
with little opposition, but they also offered an opportunity for the occupied
population to air complaints about the governing regime. In Aquitaine, the
Estates was closely involved with granting taxes and its role and remit
developed over the course of the war. This may well have influenced English
approaches to the Estates of Normandy, which was first summoned (to Rouen) in
January 1421. In Normandy that first meeting of the Estates signalled an end to
martial law and the beginning of a period of greater local consultation. During
the English occupation there would be some sixty-four meetings of the full
Estates and local assemblies.[51] Such meetings may
have reduced political friction; certainly orders regularly followed them,
seeking to prevent illegal and excessive activities by soldiers and garrisons.
However, they were not sufficient to prevent rebellion. In Aquitaine, the
hearth tax (fouage), despite being granted by the Estates in 1368,
encouraged a rebellion, albeit one fuelled by the activities of the Valois
court. In a similar fashion the taxes demanded by the Anglo-Burgundian
administration in fifteenth-century Paris proved extremely unpopular.[52] Peasant rebellions
also shook English-occupied Normandy in the years either side of the Congress
of Arras (1434–36) and in 1443. These have often been characterised as
nationalist revolts; certainly they were repressed severely for fear that was
the case, but taxation was, again, a major cause of the uprisings rather than
just loyalty to Charles VII.[53]
Nonetheless,
there was no great love for the English regime in Normandy. Just as Henry V had
been able to capture many towns without resistance, so they returned equally
willingly to French allegiance.[54] Any loyalty to the
English regime in 1449–50, as to the Valois in 1417–19, was outweighed by fear
of assault, pillage and slaughter. Mantes, for example, the last English
bastion to fall in the pays de conquête, had been placed on a war
footing after Charles VII declared war on 17 July 1449. It surrendered,
apparently by common consent of the residents, to the advancing French army and
the townspeople begged forgiveness for some thirty years of ‘disloyalty’. The
English garrison had already withdrawn without attempting a defence, perhaps
persuaded to leave by the townspeople as they were at Lisieux, Coutances and
Avranches. By this stage there was little hope that English reinforcements
would be sent. While Normandy retained a special place in the English popular
imagination, few Englishmen were willing to fund its defence.[55]
Among the
main concerns of English regimes in France were military and political
security, the maintenance of law and order and the collection of taxation. In
addition to these they tried to ensure resources and information were not
passed to the enemy. In Wales and Ireland legislation was enacted to prohibit
native entertainers performing, as they were believed to be spying out English
defences, although special licences to perform in English areas were often
granted.[56] In
the same fashion strict attempts were made to regulate contact between
Lancastrian/Burgundian France and the ‘kingdom of Bourges’ in the fifteenth
century. In particular there were concerns about the activities of French
clergymen, many of whom were believed to be spies. In 1432 the abbess of Saint
Antoine in Paris and some of her nuns were imprisoned when she was accused of
collaborating with her nephew to betray the city.[57] In England there
were, similarly, longstanding concerns about the activities of members of alien
priories. In a petition of 1373 the Commons in the English Parliament requested
that
no French alien prior shall dwell within twenty leagues of the sea coasts;
considering that they are French in their bodies, and from time to time spy
upon the secrets and ordinances at parliaments and councils; and they send
their spies and messengers to their abbots and superiors in the realm of France
as well as bows and arrows, gold and silver, and other weapons, in comfort of
[the king’s] enemies and to the detriment of the country.[58]
Such
concerns also recognised the importance of the Church and clergy in gaining and
maintaining control throughout the English lordships. Restrictions on Gaelic
Irishmen holding ecclesiastical offices in the Anglo-Irish colony had been
introduced early in the thirteenth century and continued to be enforced, albeit
patchily. In Wales, too, rather counter-productive attempts were made to
exploit patronage rights over church offices[59]. Henry V also used
the Church and its members to bolster his regime in Normandy. Many Norman
churchmen were, it seems, relatively comfortable with political change, and the
new regime may well have offered them greater independence than they had
enjoyed in the past. Clearly, though, this did not inculcate a deep sense of
loyalty to England and her kings as many rallied to Charles VII in 1449–50. In
Paris and nearby Saint-Denis the English made particular attempts to secure the
support of the local clergy. The ideological importance of these places, so
central to the identity and spiritual and political authority of the French
state, ensured that they were at the heart of English attempts to project an
image of legitimate rule and to solicit support for the new regime.
Ecclesiastical ritual, processions and ceremonies were used widely in the French
capital, as they were in England, as a vehicle for propaganda:[60]
… in
September [1424] the Regent [John, duke of Bedford] arrived in Paris. The city
was decorated everywhere he was to go and the streets decorated and cleaned …
some of Paris’s processions went out into the country to meet him … When they
met, they sang loudly Te Deum laudamus and other praises to God. Wherever he
passed by, everyone shouted ‘Noel!’ When he came to the corner of the Rue aux
Lombards there was an acrobat there performing as cleverly as anyone had ever
seen. In front of the Châtelet there was a very fine Mystery of the Old and New
Testaments done by the children of Paris … [Then] he went onto Notre Dame,
where he was received as if he had been God … In short more honour was never
done at a Roman triumph than was done that day to him.[61]
Paris,
though, from the outset was considered a very different sort of colony. After
the treaty of Troyes the capital saw relatively few changes in its government,
which had been in Burgundian control since 1418. Because of the city’s
political and ideological significance it was vital to secure the allegiance of
the most important officers of the central government, especially members of
the parlement and the chambre des comptes.[62] Although the duke of
Bedford was a regular and important presence, there was limited English
influence over Paris’s day-to-day administration. No more than three Englishmen
held office in the Paris Chancery, while the prévôt, responsible
for order in the city, tended to be a Burgundian. And although the military
governorship of Paris was often held by an Englishman, this was not always the
case. Thomas, duke of Clarence, held the office in 1420, Thomas Beaufort, duke
of Exeter, in 1421, and Humphrey Stafford, duke of Buckingham, in 1430–32.[63]
After
the murder of Jean the Fearless in 1419, it seems that most of those Parisians
who remained were ready, albeit reluctantly, to ally themselves with the
Lancastrians. Their chief loyalty, however, was to Burgundy, though even this
was not unquestioning and there were a number of plots to deliver the city to
the dauphinists. In the main, however, Anglo-Burgundian rule seemed to offer
the best opportunity for peace and a secure future in the city and its
environs. Conditions were, however, far from calm for much of this period. The
Parisian Bourgeois, famously, described the endemic lawlessness in Paris and
its hinterland – for example, merchants were said to need an armed guard before
they brought cattle to the town’s butchers. The limited support for the new
regime and tensions within that regime were evident from early in the
occupation and not helped by dreadful food shortages: ‘In the year 1420 you
might see all over Paris here ten there twenty or thirty children, boys and girls,
dying of hunger and of cold on the rubbish heaps … yet the poor householders
could do nothing to help them – no one had any bread, corn, firewood, or
charcoal.’[64]
Sadly,
this was not an isolated incident. During the Anglo-Burgundian occupation
Parisians had to cope with a string of brutal winters, wet springs and poor
harvests. In 1421, even the wolves were starving: ‘they used to uncover with
their paws the bodies of people buried … for wherever you went, in the town or
the country, you found people dead of the dreadful poverty that they suffered
because of scarcity and famine caused by the accursed war’.[65] In early 1427 the
ground was said to have been frozen for 36 days. The ordinary citizen could buy
nothing to eat for less than two pence, which was beyond many. When the frosts
finally ended, the rains began and seemed unceasing.[66]
In
response to political ambivalence and climatic hostility the new regime made
strenuous efforts to bolster its image and slander the enemy. A wide range of
propaganda was employed – songs were sung, symbols and badges displayed,
processions and various rituals took place; suitable information was
disseminated, successes publicised, an image of an ordered purposeful society
was projected.[67] But
despite Bedford’s ‘bread and circuses’ policy, attitudes to the English
remained mixed. As the Parisian Bourgeois wrote in February 1423, ‘all
Parisians took an oath … to be loyal and true to the Duke of Bedford, Regent of
France … to obey him in all things and all places and to do all they could to
harass Charles who called himself King of France and all his allies and
associates. Some were glad to do this, others most reluctant.’[68] There was,
therefore, a grudging acceptance of the need for an alliance, but generations
of enmity were not quickly forgotten. And while there was a significant number
of marriages between the English and Parisians, and certain members of the
English nobility became major patrons of art and luxury goods, on the whole the
English were seen as arrogant and belligerent (and bad cooks). Disputes may
also have been encouraged by a growing language barrier, exaggerated by a
particular Parisian cant. However, as insults seem to have caused a number of
arguments, issues of language were clearly not insurmountable. In Paris, as
elsewhere, there was a good deal of racially abusive language – the English
were regularly referred to as ‘Goddons’ (God-damns) because they swore so
often.[69]
Although
the occupation received far from unanimous support, in the main Paris
maintained its allegiance to Burgundy and her ally. This is seen most clearly
in the resistance to Joan of Arc and it explains why there was only a token
English military force in situ. In a city of perhaps 80,000 people, the
garrison never exceeded 2,000 troops. The main English presence was at the
Bastille. When Sir John Fastolf was appointed captain of the Bastille in
January 1421, he commanded a miserly 8 men-at-arms and 26 archers. Under Thomas
More in 1431 it did not number in excess of 50 men, including servants. Indeed,
it appears to have been deliberate policy to keep the garrison as unobtrusive
as possible.[70] Similarly,
in Saint-Denis, the town housing the abbey, north of Paris, it was only Charles
VII’s approach in August 1429 that led to a garrison being deployed. Like
Paris, Saint-Denis came under English control through the treaty of Troyes and
so was never considered part of the pays de conquête. The
townspeople, however, were even less committed in their political sympathies
than the Parisians. Once the garrison of Saint-Denis had proved ineffective,
they capitulated immediately to Joan and Charles, who established their
headquarters in the town. Then, when Charles withdrew, having failed to take
Paris on 13 September 1429, Anglo-Burgundian control was restored in
Saint-Denis alongside heavy fines imposed as punishment for the townsmen’s lack
of loyalty.[71]
The
attack on the capital, however, made Parisians increasingly doubtful about the
merits of the alliance. Costs were rising to support the defence and, clearly,
the English were not providing the stability that so many wanted. As elsewhere,
people tended to take a pragmatic approach to such matters. Practical concerns
and basic survival instincts took priority over ‘national’ allegiances, which,
in the fifteenth century were further complicated by the French civil war.[72] Indeed, who was
‘foreign’ in such circumstances? For many Frenchmen, Bretons, Burgundians or
Gascons might be no less foreign than the English. Political conditions meant
that one might be occupied by a foreigner who was also a political ally.
Charles VII’s grants of high office to various Scotsmen in the ‘kingdom of
Bourges’, for example, caused considerable animosity. John Stewart, third earl
of Buchan (c.1380–1424), received Châtillon-sur-Indre and became constable of
France in 1421 as a reward for leading the Franco-Scots army to victory at
Baugé in March of that year. Archibald, fourth earl of Douglas (c.1369–1424),
received the duchy of Touraine in 1424 and was named lieutenant-general of the
king for the war against England, an unprecedented position for a non-royal
foreigner. The city of Tours clearly resented the authority he wielded there
until his death at the battle of Verneuil in August 1424. Douglas’s son, the
fifth earl (also Archibald; c.1391–1439), succeeded his father as duke of
Touraine – he had previously been endowed with the lands of Dun-le-roi in Berry
and the title of count of Longueville (then in English hands). However, such
foreign appointments tended to be driven by extreme circumstances; and foreign
recruitment both military and to high office lessened thereafter. Royal gifts
made in times of desperation might quickly be revoked when the crisis had
passed. By contrast Orléans had a Scottish bishop, John Carmichael, a substantial
Scottish presence in its university and there relations appeared to be
amicable.[73]
Any
mention of Orléans inevitably draws one’s thoughts to Joan of Arc whose own
experience of occupation shaped her extraordinary life. Raised in a region on
the very limits of the realm, close to Burgundian and pro-Burgundian territory,
she was born into a world in which the threat of violence and occupation was a
daily reality. Her village of Domremy was menaced regularly by mercenaries,
English soldiers and Burgundian forces. Members of the village community often
herded their animals onto an island in the River Meuse, which offered some
protection from attack. But the accounts from Joan’s trials (both of
Condemnation and Nullification) reveal that village life certainly did not
collapse despite these conditions. Joan was able to make her little pilgrimages
to the nearby hermitage of Notre-Dame de Bermont; she fed the animals,
occasionally helped with the ploughing, prepared hemp and wool and continued to
follow the rituals of rural life. Clearly, Joan’s early life was influenced by
military activity, political instability and struggles for local control, but
until about 1424 there is relatively little evidence of major disturbance in
the region. However, about that time a series of border raids began and there
were serious attacks on Domremy – the church was set on fire and pillaged.
Mercenaries and Anglo-Burgundian forces assaulted the right bank of the Meuse
and many of the villagers were forced to flee with their livestock to
Neufchâteau. It was amidst these attacks in 1425 that Joan began to hear her
‘voices’.[74] The
consequence of this would change the course of the Hundred Years War.
[1] Parisian Journal,
191.
[2] Allmand, Henry
V, 186–204.
[3] D. Grummitt,
‘Écorcheurs’, Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military
Technology, ed. Rogers, II, 13. See also Rogers, ‘By Fire and Sword: Bellum
Hostileand “Civilians” in the Hundred Years War’, Civilians in the
Path of War, ed. Grimsley and Rogers, 47–9, 53. In the fifteenth century,
during Bedford’s regime, the garrisons in Normandy on the Maine frontier
derived an annual income of 25,000 livres in protection money
by raiding across the border: Wright, Knights and Peasants, 78.
[4] C. T. Allmand, Lancastrian
Normandy, 1415–1450: The History of a Medieval Occupation (Oxford,
1983), 211.
[5] J. Sumption, ‘Angle,
Guichard (IV) d’, Earl of Huntingdon (c.1308/15–1380)’, ODNB(online
edn, 2006); D. Green, The Black Prince (Stroud, rev. edn,
2008), 181–7.
[6] Chronique du
Mont-St-Michel (1343–1468), ed. S. Luce, 2 vols (Paris, 1879), I, 168 n. 2;
J. Barker, ‘The Foe Within: Treason in Lancastrian Normandy’, Soldiers,
Nobles and Gentlemen, ed. Coss and Tyerman, 310–11.
[7] A. Bossuat, ‘The
Re-Establishment of Peace in Society during the Reign of Charles VII’, The
Recovery of France in the Fifteenth Century, ed. P. S. Lewis, trans. G. F.
Martin (London, 1971), 65.
[8] Juvénal des
Ursins, Les écrits politiques, III, 109.
[9] Barker, Conquest,
50–2, 65–71.
[10] AN JJ 107, no. 11;
cited by Wright, Knights and Peasants, 90.
[11] Parisian Journal,
167.
[12] For the oath of
allegiance demanded by the English of Frenchmen after the treaty of Troyes, see
TNA C 47/30/9/10; M. Mercer, Henry V: The Rebirth of Chivalry(London,
2004), 70–1.
[13] A. Curry, ‘Lancastrian
Normandy: The Jewel in the Crown’, England and Normandy in the Middle
Ages, ed. Bates and Curry, 236.
[14] R. A. Griffiths, ‘The
English Realm and Dominions and the King’s Subjects in the Later Middle
Ages’, Aspects of Late Medieval Government and Society, ed. Rowe,
84–5.
[15] D. Green, ‘Lordship
and Principality: Colonial Policy in Ireland and Aquitaine in the 1360s’, Journal
of British Studies, 47 (2008), 26–7 and nn. 116–18; A. J. Otway-Ruthven,
‘Ireland in the 1350s: Sir Thomas Rokeby and his Successors’, Journal
of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland, 97 (1967), 47–9; R. Frame,
‘Thomas Rokeby, Sheriff of Yorkshire, Justiciar of Ireland’, Peritia,
10 (1996), 275, 285–6, 290, 294; idem, ‘Rokeby, Sir Thomas
(d.1357)’, ODNB (online edn, 2008).
[16] Among Fastolf’s many
offices he served the duke of Clarence in Aquitaine (1412–13); as deputy-constable
of Bordeaux, captain of Soubise and Veyres (1413–14); captain of Harfleur and
Fecamp (1417–21); and lieutenant in Normandy (1422): G. L. Harriss, ‘Fastolf,
Sir John (1380–1459)’, ODNB (online edn, 2009).
[17] John Talbot’s official
positions included: commander of the English garrisons at Montgomery and
Bishop’s Castle (1404); captain of Caernarfon (1409); lieutenant of Ireland
(1414); lieutenant-general for the conduct of the war on the eastern front
(1434); marshal of France (1436); lieutenant of Ireland (1445); commander of
Lower Normandy (1448); lieutenant of Gascony (1452): A. J. Pollard, John
Talbot and the War in France 1427–1453 (Barnsley, 2nd edn, 1983); A.
J. Pollard, ‘Talbot, John, First Earl of Shrewsbury and First Earl of Waterford
(c.1387–1453)’, ODNB(online edn, 2008).
[18] J. Watts, ‘Richard of
York, Third Duke of York (1411–1460)’, ODNB (online edn,
2009); T. B. Pugh, ‘Richard Plantagenet (1411–60), Duke of York, as the King’s
Lieutenant in France and Ireland’, Aspects of Late Medieval Government
and Society, ed. Rowe, 107–41.
[19] M. W. Labarge, Gascony,
England’s First Colony, 1204–1453 (London, 1980); R. Frame,
‘Overlordship and Reaction, c.1200–c.1450’, Ireland and Britain,
1170–1450(London, 1998), 77–8; R. Boutruche, ‘Anglais et Gascons en
Aquitaine du XIIe au XVesiècles. Problèmes
d’histoire sociale’, Mélanges d’histoire dédiés à la mémoire de Louis
Halphen (Paris, 1951), 57.
[20] Histoire générale
de Languedoc avec des notes et les pièces justificatives, ed. C. de Vic and
J. Vaissètte, rev. edn A. Molinier, 16 vols (Toulouse, 1872–1904), X, 1,404–6;
Barber, Edward Prince of Wales, 213; Ormrod, Reign of
Edward III, 36; Green, Edward the Black Prince, 134–5; Green,
‘Lordship and Principality’, 3–30. For a different interpretation of conditions
in Aquitaine and of the nature of the prince’s administration, see G. Pépin,
‘Towards a New Assessment of the Black Prince’s Principality of Aquitaine: A
Study of the Last Years (1369–72)’, Nottingham Medieval Studies, 50
(2006), 59–114; G. Pépin, ‘The Parlement of Anglo-Gascon Aquitaine: The Three
Estates of Aquitaine (Guyenne)’, Nottingham Medieval Studies, 52
(2008), 133–45.
[21] Westminster
Chronicle, 484.
[22] Wright, Knights
and Peasants, 77.
[23] M. Jones, ‘Les
capitaines anglo-bretons et les marches entre la Bretagne et le Poitou de 1342
à 1373’, La ‘France anglaise’ au Moyen Âge, ed. R. H. Bautier
(Paris, 1988), 357–75; M. Jones, ‘Edward III’s Captains in Brittany’, England
in the Fourteenth Century, ed. W. M. Ormrod (Woodbridge, 1986), 99–118; M.
Jones, Ducal Brittany, 1364–1399: Relations with England and France
during the Reign of Duke John IV (Oxford, 1970), 1–21.
[24] Repressive legislation
enforced in Wales in the early fifteenth century built on that first introduced
in the 1284 Statute of Rhuddlan/Wales: Statutes of the Realm, II,
128–9, 140–1; I. Bowen, ed., The Statutes of Wales (London,
1908), 31–7; CPR, 1399–1401, 469–70; R. A. Griffiths, The
Principality of Wales in the Later Middle Ages: The Structure and Personnel of
Government, I: South Wales, 1277–1536(Cardiff, 1972), xix; R.
R. Davies, The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr (Oxford, 1995), 65–93.
[25] A. Curry, ‘Sir Thomas
Erpingham: A Career in Arms’, Agincourt, 1415, ed. A. Curry
(Stroud, 2000), 66; Allmand, Henry V, 209; A. Chapman, ‘The King’s
Welshmen: Welsh Involvement in the Expeditionary Army of 1415’, Journal
of Medieval Military History, IX, ed. A. Curry and A. Bell (Woodbridge,
2011), 41–63. Welsh troops continued to be recruited throughout Henry’s
campaigns, for example in 1420: TNA E403/645/6.
[26] H. F. Berry,
ed., Statutes and Ordinances, and Acts of the Parliament of Ireland:
King John to Henry V (Dublin, 1907), 430–69; S. Duffy, ‘The Problem of
Degeneracy’, Law and Disorder in Thirteenth-Century Ireland: The Dublin
Parliament of 1297, ed. J. Lydon (Dublin, 1997), 87–106; J. Lydon, ‘Nation
and Race in Medieval Ireland’,Concepts of National Identity in the Middle
Ages, ed. S. Forde, L. Johnson and A. V. Murray (Leeds, 1995), 105.
[27] J. Le Patourel, ‘The
Plantagenet Dominions’, History, 50 (1965), 306.
[28] For the approximate
boundaries of the pays de conquête, see J. H. Wylie and W. T.
Waugh, The Reign of Henry the Fifth, 3 vols (Cambridge, 1914–29),
III, 235–7.
[29] Allmand, Henry
V, 16–38; Curry, Agincourt: A New History, 16–17.
[30] Harriss,
‘Introduction: The Exemplar of Kingship’, Henry V: The Practice of
Kingship, 29; Curry, ‘Lancastrian Normandy: The Jewel in the Crown?’, England
and Normandy, ed. Bates and Curry, 241–52.
[31] Gesta Henrici
Quinti, 16–18; J. J. N. Palmer, ‘The War Aims of the Protagonists and the
Negotiations for Peace’, The Hundred Years War, ed. Fowler, 54–5;
Barker, Agincourt, 14.
[32] Curry, ‘Lancastrian
Normandy: The Jewel in the Crown?’, 237–8; Allmand, Lancastrian
Normandy, 126.
[33] R. E. Glasscock, ‘Land
and People c.1300’, A New History of Ireland, II: Medieval
Ireland 1169–1534, ed. A. Cosgrove (Oxford, 1987), 212–16; R. R. Davies,
‘Colonial Wales’, Past and Present, 65 (1974), 3–6, 11; C. T.
Allmand, ‘The Lancastrian Land Settlement in Normandy, 1417–50’, Economic
History Review, 2nd ser. 21 (1968), 463.
[34] In retaliation Charles
(VII), at the assembly of the Estates General held in Selles in January 1421,
declared the property of those who had remained in English occupied territories
confiscated and distributed it, in theory, to his own followers: Bossuat,
‘Re-Establishment of Peace’, 62.
[35] R. Massey, ‘The
Lancastrian Land Settlement in Normandy and Northern France, 1417–1450’, unpub.
PhD thesis (University of Liverpool, 1987), 67–178; L. Puisseux, L’émigration
normande et la colonisation anglaise en Normandie au XVe siècle (Paris,
1866), 66; Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy, 61–3; Curry, ‘Lancastrian
Normandy: The Jewel in the Crown?’, 241.
[36] These lands reverted
to the Crown after Clarence’s death at the battle of Baugé (1421).
[37] Montague’s offices and
titles in France included captain of Honfleur (1419–20); lieutenant-general in
Normandy and in the marches south of the Seine (appointed 26 April 1419),
extended to the whole duchy of Normandy and Maine on 13 November 1420; governor
of Alençon, Bonsmoulins and Verneuil (1420–23): A. Curry, ‘Montagu, Thomas,
Fourth Earl of Salisbury (1388–1428)’, ODNB (online edn,
2008).
[38] Allmand, ‘The
Lancastrian Land Settlement’, 463–6; idem, Lancastrian Normandy,
52–6.
[39] Sumption, Trial
by Battle, 576–83; S. Rose, Calais: An English Town in France,
1347–1558 (Woodbridge, 2008), 7–22.
[40] Rymer, Feodera,
III, i, 548; R. Favreau, ‘Comptes de la sénéchaussée de Saintonge,
1360–2’, BEC, 117 (1959), 76–8; idem, ‘La cession de La
Rochelle à l’Angleterre en 1360’, La ‘France anglaise’ au Moyen Âge,
ed. Bautier, 222–7; P. Chaplais, ‘Some Documents Regarding the Fulfilment and
Interpretation of the Treaty of Brétigny’,Camden Society, 3rd ser. 19
(1952), 52–3 and nn. 1–2.
[41] Green, ‘Lordship and
Principality’, 8–9, 20–1; Delachenal, Charles V, IV, 18–20, 67; P.
Boissonnade, Histoire de Poitou (Paris, 1941), 136–7; É.
Labroue, Bergerac sous les Anglais (Bordeaux, 1893), 66; A.
Higounet-Nadal, Périgueux au XIVe et XVesiècles (Bordeaux,
1978), 148.
[42] A. Curry, ‘Towns at
War: Norman Towns under English Rule, 1417–1450’, Towns and Townspeople
in the Fifteenth Century, ed. J. A. Thomson (Gloucester, 1989), 149.
[43] C. T. Allmand, ‘La
Normandie devant l’opinion anglaise à la fin de la Guerre de Cent Ans’, BEC,
128 (1970), 355; J. Lydon, ‘The Middle Nation’, The English in Medieval
Ireland, ed. J. Lydon (Dublin, 1984), 12–20.
[44] Allmand, Lancastrian
Normandy, 51.
[45] Before 1420 Gisors,
Dieppe, Caen, Falaise and Pontoise also had their privileges confirmed:
Rymer, Feodera, IV, iii, 137, 146, 199; Curry, ‘Towns at War’, 149,
157–61.
[46] A. Curry, A. Bell, A.
Chapman, A. King and D. Simpkin, ‘Languages in the Military Profession in Later
Medieval England’, The Anglo-Norman Language and its Contexts, ed.
R. Ingham (York, 2010), 81–2, 85, 87–8.
[47] For the garrison sizes
at Bayeux, Caudebec, Coutances, Caen, Carentan, Verneuil and Pont-de-l’Arche in
1433–4, see J. Stevenson, ed., Letters and Papers Illustrative of the
Wars of the English in France during the Reign of Henry the Sixth, King of
England, 3 vols (London, 1861–4), II, ii, 540–6.
[48] Captains of Mantes
included: Sir John Grey (later count of Tancarville); Edmund, earl of March;
John Handford; Richard Guethin; Ralph Grey; Thomas Hoo; and Richard Lowick. A.
Curry, ‘Bourgeois et soldats dans la ville de Mantes pendant l’occupation anglaise
de 1419 à 1449’, Guerre, pouvoir et noblesse au Moyen Âge. Mélanges en
l’honneur de Philippe Contamine, ed. J. Paviot and J. Verger (Paris, 2000),
179–80, 183; idem, ‘Towns at War’, 148–50, 153, 156, 162; idem,
‘The Nationality of Men-at-Arms Serving in English Armies in Normandy and the
Pays-de-Conquête, 1415–1450’, Reading Medieval Studies, 18 (1992),
157.
[49] A. Curry, ‘Isolated or
Integrated? The English Soldier in Lancastrian Normandy’, Courts and
Regions in Medieval Europe, ed. S. Rees Jones, R. Marks and A. J. Minnis
(York, 2000), 192; Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy, 80.
[50] P. Crooks, ‘Factions,
Feuds and Noble Power in the Lordship of Ireland, c.1356–1496’, Irish
Historical Studies, 35 (2007), 434–6; P. Capra, ‘Les bases sociales du
pouvoir anglo-gascon au milieu du XIVe siècle’, Le
Moyen Âge, 4ème sér. 81 (1975), 276; idem, ‘L’évolution de
l’administration anglo-gasconne au milieu du XIVesiècle’,Bordeaux
et les Iles britanniques du XIIIe au XXe siècle (Bordeaux,
1975), 23; J. Given, State and Society in Medieval Europe: Gwynedd and
Languedoc under Outside Rule (Ithaca, NY, and London, 1990), 154–66;
Curry, ‘Lancastrian Normandy: The Jewel in the Crown?’, 250.
[51] Pépin, ‘Parlement of
Anglo-Gascon Aquitaine’, 135, 137–8, 145–9, 153–6. See also Palmer, England,
France and Christendom, 152–65; C. J. Phillpotts, ‘John of Gaunt and
English Policy towards France, 1389–1395’, Journal of Medieval History,
16 (1990), 363–86; Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy, 171–86; Curry,
‘Towns at War’, 159, 163.
[52] Histoire générale
de Languedoc, X, 1404–6; Thompson, Paris and its People, 28–9.
[53] M. K. Jones,
‘L’imposition illégale de taxes en “Normandie anglaise”: une enquête
gouvernementale en 1446’, La ‘France anglaise’, ed. Bautier, 461–8;
Wright, Knights and Peasants, 87.
[54] Curry, ‘Towns at War’,
153, 155–8, 165–6.
[55] Curry, ‘Towns at War’,
162. Mantes provides one of the best examples of the reconquest. The
town’s Déliberations have been used extensively by Anne Curry.
They are found in Mantes-la-Jolie; Bibliothèque Municipale, Archives Communales
de Mantes, Série BB 5ff.
[56] Berry, Statutes
and Ordinances, 447; E. Tresham, ed., Rotulorum Patentium et
Clausorum Cancellarie Hibernie Calendarium (Dublin, 1828), Pat. 49
Edward III, 94 no. 164.
[57] Parisian Bourgeois,
281; Vale, Charles VII, 122; Thompson, Paris and its People,
8–9.
[58] W. M. Ormrod, ed.,
‘Edward III: Parliament of 1373, Text and Translation’, PROME, item
32. See also A. K. McHardy, ‘The Effects of War on the Church: The Case of the
Alien Priories in the Fourteenth Century’, England and her Neighbours,
ed. Jones and Vale, 277–95.
[59] F. X. Martin, ‘John,
Lord of Ireland, 1185–1216’, A New History of Ireland, II, ed.
Cosgrove, 153; R. R. Davies, The Age of Conquest: Wales, 1063–1415 (Oxford,
1991), 398.
[60] Allmand, ‘The English
and the Church in Lancastrian Normandy’, England and Normandy, ed.
Bates and Curry, 287–9; idem, Lancastrian Normandy, 218;
Thompson, Paris and its People, 158–9, 171–5, 179ff.
[61] Parisian Journal,
200–1.
[62] J. Favier, ‘Occupation
ou connivence? Les Anglais à Paris (1422–1436)’, Guerre, pouvoir et
noblesse au Moyen Âge Contamine, ed. Paviot and Verger, 247;
Thompson, Paris and its People, 151.
[63] Stafford also served
as constable of France, and lieutenant-general of Normandy. Clarence held
the vicomtés of Auge, Orbec and Pont Audemer until his death
in 1421. Beaufort served, briefly, as lieutenant in Aquitaine (1413–14), and as
captain of some of Henry V’s major conquests – Harfleur, Rouen, Conches and
Melun, in addition to Paris.
[64] Parisian Journal,
155. After the treaty of Arras the Burgundians played a crucial role in
recapturing Paris for Charles VII: Thompson, Paris and its People,
10, 37–44, 149–50, 159, 208–9, 238.
[65] Parisian Journal, 161.
[66] R. R. Butler, Is
Paris Lost? The English Occupation, 1422–1436 (Staplehurst, 2003),
65–6.
[67] G. Llewelyn Thompson,
‘Le régime anglo-bourguignon à Paris: facteurs idéologiques’, La
‘France anglaise’ au Moyen Âge, ed. Bautier, 53–60; idem, ‘“Monseigneur
Saint Denis”, his Abbey, and his Town, under the English Occupation,
1420–1436’, Power, Culture, and Religion in France, c.1350–c.1550,
ed. C. T. Allmand (Woodbridge, 1989), 19.
[68] Parisian Bourgeois,
185.
[69] S. Roux, Paris
in the Middle Ages, trans. Jo Ann McNamara (Philadelphia, PA, 2009), 59;
Griffiths, Reign of Henry VI, 516; Thompson, Paris and its
People, 208–9, 216–17; Favier, ‘Occupation ou connivence?’, 252;
Barker, Conquest, 70.
[70] G.L. Harriss,
‘Fastolf, Sir John (1380–1459)’, ODNB (online edn, 2004);
Favier, ‘Occupation ou connivence?’, 249–50.
[71] Charles d’Orléans’s
Italian secretary Antonio Astesano described conditions in Saint-Denis in 1451:
Antonio Astesano, ‘Éloge descriptif de la ville de Paris et des principales
villes de France en 1451’, ed. A. Le Roux de Lincy and L.–M. Tisserand, Paris
et ses historiens aux XIV–XV siècles (Paris, 1867), 552. See also
Thompson, ‘Monseigneur Saint Denis’, 15–18, 27–8.
[72] This was certainly the
case when Limoges renounced its loyalty to the Black Prince in 1370. See Paul
Ducourtieux, Histoire de Limoges (Limoges, 1925, repr.
Marseille, 1975), 53, 59; Barber, Edward, Prince of Wales, 224–6
and n. 23; Keen, Laws of War, 120–1, 124; Green, Edward the
Black Prince, 90–3. The English regimes in Normandy and Paris faced similar
problems after 1435 with the collapse of the Burgundian alliance at the
Congress of Arras: see Parisian Journal, 318; Allmand,
‘Lancastrian Land Settlement’, 471.
[73] B. G. H. Ditcham,
‘“Mutton Guzzlers and Wine Bags”: Foreign Soldiers and Native Reactions in
Fifteenth-Century France’, Power, Culture and Religion in France,
ed. Allmand, 2–4, 6–8; Norman MacDougall, An Antidote to the English:
The Auld Alliance, 1295–1560 (East Linton, 2001), 59–77; M. H. Brown,
‘Stewart, John, third earl of Buchan (c.1380–1424)’, ODNB (online
edn, 2006); idem, ‘Douglas, Archibald, fourth earl of Douglas,
and duke of Touraine in the French nobility (c.1369–1424)’, ODNB (online
edn, 2006); idem, ‘Douglas, Archibald, fifth earl of Douglas,
and duke of Touraine in the French nobility (c.1391–1439)’, ODNB (online
edn, 2006).
[74] L. Taylor, The
Virgin Warrior: The Life and Death of Joan of Arc (New Haven, CT, and
London, 2009), 2, 11–12, 14–15, 21–2.
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